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A. Interpretation – In the AC, aff must unconditionally defend implementation of a developing country policy. He doesn’t need a plan to meet the interp. He just needs a stable government action that I can link disads to.

B. Violation – aff refuses to specify a real-world policy.

Spirit of the law is what matters. Don’t let the aff exploit loopholes in interp wording. It doesn’t matter if she technically meets the text as long as she violates the clear intention of the interp because that’s where the abuse comes from.

C. Standards

1. Ground. Core neg arguments like growth or poverty links assume implementation. No one says resource extraction is intrinsically valuable.

Implementation-focus is the core of the topic lit. **Olivera 2** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

**The literature is proficient in describing** cases of **failures in implementing environmental policies in developing countries**, such as in India (Reich & Bowonder, 1992; Vyas & Reddy, 1998), China (Jan, 1995; Ross, 1992), Eastern European countries (Hardi, 1992; Klarer & Francis, 1997), and Latin America (Ames & Keck, 1997; Pichon, 1992). Common explanations for policy failure range from the classical Malthusian paradigm regarding rapid population growth to widespread corruption in political systems (Sham, 1994). Although these explanations may often be true, they do not suggest practical solutions to problems in implementing environmental policies in developing countries. **To be useful to policymakers, analyzes must identify** the main **factors that impede successful implementation and suggest how these obstacles could be overcome**. Toward that end, understanding the political economy in which the implementation process occurs is crucial. As Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) recognized, implementation––and we could say especially environmental policy––encompasses the governmental and nongovernmental sector as well as interorganizational links. **Thus, scholars have begun to analyze how organizations** work together to success- **fully implement environmental policy in developing countries** (Brinkerhoff, 1996; Lemos, 1998; Lopes, Bastos Filho, Biller, & Bale, 1996). This literature provides practical recommendations to policymakers.

2. Real-World Policy Making Education

Aff forces us to debate about philosophy in the abstract instead of real world implementation concerns. That kills education. 90% of policymaking is deciding on implementation. **Elmore 80**[[2]](#footnote-2)

The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by **policy** analysts that **decisions are not self-executing.** Analysis of policy choices matter very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood in answering **the** question, "What **percentage of** the **work** of achieving a desired governmental action is **done when the preferred** analytic **alternative has been identified**?" Allison estimated that in the normal case, it **was about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation**.

D. Voter – Education comes first because it’s the end goal of debate and the only portable skill. Substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational benefit to discussing it. Dropping the argument doesn’t solve because it’s too late to restart from the AC and have an educational debate. Also, the ballot has to set good norms for future rounds because debaters care first and foremost about winning, meaning voting on theory is the only way to deter bad arguments.

Prefer competing interpretations because reasonability is arbitrary and requires judge intervention.

Switch side policy debate has an out of round impact. It’s the best method for effecting change in energy policy.

**Hager 92** (, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92 (Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some **activists turned to the parliamentary arena** as a possible forum **for** an **energy dialogue**. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have **an institutional lever** with which **to pry apart** the **bureaucracy** and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen movement. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affecting local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored industrial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the **necessary change** would require a degree of political restructuring that **could only be accomplished through** their **direct participation in** parliamentary **politics**. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishmento f a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and **by producing a** modernization **plan** itself**, the** combined citizen **initiative** and AL **forced bureaucratic authorities to push** the utility for **improvements** . They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the **public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers** to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmentally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simultaneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protection of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggravate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at Systemkritik.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitimation dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more problematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda. Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of **the energy issue forced** citizen **activists to become both participants** in **and critics of the policy process**. In order to defeat the plant, **activists engaged in technical debate. They won** several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often **proving** to be **more informed than bureaucratic experts** themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, **grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics**.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The **attempts of** the **established** political **parties to coopt** "green" issues **have** also **met with limited success**. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

Environmental policy discussions are key to critical thinking and decision-making skills. **Pereiro-Munoz et al 2** write[[3]](#footnote-3)

If **science** education **and environmental education have as a goal to develop critical thinking** and to promote decision making, it seems that the **acknowledgement of** a variety of **experts** and expertise **is of relevance** to both**. Otherwise citizens could be unable to challenge a common view that places econ**omical issues and technical features **over other** types of values or **concerns**. As McGinn and Roth (1999) argue, **citizens should be prepared to participate** in scientific practice, to be involved **in situations where science is**, if not created, at least **used.** The **assessment of environmental management is**, in our opinion, **one of these, and citizens do not need to possess all the technical knowledge to** be able to **examine** the positive and negative **impacts and** to **weigh** them up. The identification of instances of scientific practice in classroom discourse is difficult especially if this practice is viewed as a complex process, not as fixed ‘steps’. Several instances were identified when it could be said that students acted as a knowledge-producing community in spite of the fact that the students, particularly at the beginning of the sequence, expressed doubts about their capacities to assess a project written by experts and endorsed by a government office. Perhaps these doubts relate to the nature of the project, a ‘real life’ object that made its way into the classroom, into the ‘school life’. As Brown et al. (1989) point out, there is usually a difference between practitioners’ tasks and stereotyped school tasks and, it could be added, students are not used to being confronted with the complexity of ‘life-size’ problems. However, as the sequence proceeded, the **students assumed the role of experts**, exposing inconsistencies in the project, **offering alternatives and discussing** it with one of its authors. The issue of expertise is worthy of attention and it needs to be explored in different contexts where the relationships among technical expertise, values hierarchies and possible biases caused by the subject matter could be unravelled. **One of the objectives of environmental education is to empower people with** the capacity of **decision making**; for this purpose the acknowledging of multiple expertise is crucial.

## K

Ecological morality is capitalist. Its hidden objective is to prop up class divisions.

**Invisible Committee 9** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Managing** the phasing out of nuclear power, **excess CO2** in the atmosphere, **melting glaciers,** hurricanes, epidemics, global **overpopulation, erosion** of the soil**, mass extinction** of living species…this **will be our burden**. They tell us, “everyone must do their part,” **if we want to save our beautiful model of civilization. We have to consume** a little **less to be able to keep consuming. We have to produce organically to keep producing. We have to control ourselves to go on controlling.** This is the logic of a world straining to maintain itself while giving itself an air of historical rupture. This is how they would like to convince us to participate in the great industrial challenges of this century. And in our bewilderment we’re ready to leap into the arms of the very same ones who presided over the devastation, in the hope that they will get us out of it. **Ecology** isn’t simply the logic of a total economy; **i**t’**s the new morality of capital.** The system’s internal state of crisis and the rigorous screening that’s underway demand a new criterion in the name of which this screening and selection will be carried out. From one era to the next, the idea of virtue has never been anything but an invention of vice. **Without ecology, how could we justify** the existence of **two different diets, one “**healthy and **organic” for the rich** and their children, **and the other** notoriously **toxic for the plebes**, whose offspring are damned to obesity. **The planetary** hyper-**bourgeoisie wouldn’t be able to make its** normal **lifestyle seem respectable if its latest whims weren’t so** scrupulously **“respectful of the environment.”** Without ecology, nothing would have enough authority to gag every objection to the exorbitant progress of control.

The aff’s promotion of sustainability doesn’t question capitalism, so it fails to solve the root cause of the environmental harms they criticize, turning case.

**McGregor 13** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

We argue for a decentralisation and collectivisation of decision-making and production. Why? Because: 1. **Capitalism is a wasteful socio-economic system that over-produces** niche **products for the minority who can afford them**. It breeds competition between private owners of productive means whose goods are made by exploited wage-slaves and then exchanged through a market for profit and perpetual growth. **Most production techniques** today **use fossil fuels** (as mentioned above). **Thus capitalism’s drive is towards profit** and expansion **and not** efficient, **sustainable** productive **practices**. Importantly, because of its nature, as to produce things based on exploitation and for sale, it ultimately under-produces for people’s needs [5] and is a system that generates regular crises. 2. States are also responsible for ecological destruction. Competition between states for power and control over people and land leads to the development of huge war industries and war technology adapted for industry. These have obvious serious negative implications for people (injuries, death, refugees, etc.) and the environment (the terrible effects of current nuclear technological failures, etc.). State-owned enterprises contribute massively to ecological destruction [8]. In South Africa, the nationalised and capitalist enterprise Eskom uses the energy released from burning coal to generate electricity. Eskom has plans to increase its use of coal for electricity. This puts into serious contradiction the South African government’s role in the Congress of Parties (or COP) -17 which took place in late 2011. Competition between states for resources (such as oil, natural gas, land, etc.) breeds conflict and war not only between countries, but also within countries, e.g. the diamond-funded civil wars of west Africa of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Also, states are not willing to enforce strong ecological protection laws against capitalist bosses and themselves as owners because these would cut into the profits and the states’ own tax revenue. 3. **Many solutions to ecological** and social **degradation don’t question a hierarchical order** of social organisation; or if they do they focus on eliminating one form of control while usually ignoring other dimensions of oppression. **Under capitalism, solutions to ecological crises are based on** consumer choice – a**green consumerism**– whereby customers choose to buy products and make choices that will supposedly help to sustain the environment, e.g. buying electric cars and energy-saving light bulbs, going vegetarian or vegan, recycling, living in eco-villages or eco-squats, etc. **This form of** consumerism, however, **is based on an** inadequate and **incorrect analysis as to where the pollution problem** actually **lies – at the doorsteps of big industry**, not individuals, and certainly not the working class and poor. **Green consumerism is then**, ultimately, **a class-based choice** and doesn’t question the role of capitalist production in creating and exacerbating ecological destruction. The majority of people, **the working class**, **does not have the financial ability to afford** these products and lifestyle choices (due to the very nature of capitalism) and thus does not have the financial power to shift production to **more sustainable**, “greener” **means**. There is also no evidence to suggest that a “greener” capitalism will adequately provide for society’s energy needs. For example, it may produce fuel efficient or electric cars, but what production procedures were used to make these cars, and how will electricity be provided for them? Energy will still have to be bought, and the many “service delivery” struggles around South Africa show that most of our people cannot afford energy. Ecological crises DO NOT, however, signal the end of capitalism itself, and we should guard against such thinking. Due to resource pressures, e.g. oil shortages, etc. and people’s struggles, capitalism will be forced to “go green”. However, this transition to different kinds of technology will be, at best, slow and lengthy and will not alter the class relations of who controls what. Also, weapons production, ultimately, cannot by its very nature be green, never mind the devastating impact it has on people the world over. Calling for more **state intervention** is another solution offered. However, this model of production and distribution **is** still **not outside a capitalist framework as it serves to centralise** control of **resources** (land, factories, water, air and people) **in the hands of those lucky few who manage** and control **the state** apparatus. **One needs only reflect on the terrible** environmental **records of** the **former East-Bloc countries to see that** a centrally-planned or **state-led development** model **is not an automatic solution to ecological** and social **degradation** (Steele, 2002).

3 impacts.

a. Capitalism renders the poor and working class uniquely susceptible to environmental harm, so the alternative is a prerequisite to aff solvency.

**McGregor 13** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

**The working class and poor bear the brunt of** economic and political domination and **ecological destruction**. Not only are we forced into wage-slavery (for those of us lucky enough to find work), but **our class** also **carries the burden of** the externalities of production (those **effects of production, like waste and pollution, that the bosses** in the state and capital **don’t pay for**)**. We also lack the ability** to make decisions **to** affect and **control industry.** The working class is forced to perform the most unclean and dangerous jobs – jobs which threaten and take the lives of workers on a very regular basis. **Capitalism and apartheid have** also **forced the** majority **black working class of south**ern **Africa to live** in poorly serviced communities **close to production sites where** the surrounding **air, soil and water are heavily polluted.** Unlike us, the bosses and the rulers (including the black politicians and businesspeople) are protected from the effects of their greed and appetite for power by their air-conditioned offices, luxury suburban homes and ostentatious holiday resorts far away from polluted zones. **Therefore we must** organise and mobilise for the **struggle against capitalism** and the state **for a** democratic and **sustainable economy** and society. We need a big movement of the working class and poor – a counterpower – that would, for example, fight for conversion of power stations to clean technologies for free electricity provision, for free and quality public transport, for sustainable growth to improve living standards worldwide, for cleaner, safer working environments. These organisations would also exist as centres of democratic social education and training, developing an anarchist counterculture equipping us for the road of struggle ahead and for the future society beckoning us towards it. We must organise and fight for an ecologically-sustainable development and economic growth in order to deal with poverty and under-development. **We will still need** a **massive** programme of house-building, **provision of electricity, water, food, etc. and large scale** ecologically-**sustainable industrialisation is vital** to this end. **Industrial tech**nology **holds** a number of **advantages over small-scale** craft **production** as to meeting the ends of development and growth. **Industry can produce** many types of **goods on a larger scale and** at a **faster rate** than craft production**, and can thus** not only increase the level of economic growth, but also **help shorten the working day, and free us from** many **unpleasant jobs. A safe environment is a basic need for the workers and** the **poor** of South Africa, the region and the world. The environment is not just something “out there” such as the veld [7] or the sea. The environment also refers to where people live and work. As such, we can distinguish between “green” ecological **issues** (**like wildlife**, trees, etc.) **and** “brown” ecological issues (like **workplace safety** and community development). The two **are obviously connected**: brown ecological issues (like lack of sewerage facilities) directly affects green ecological issues (like marine life) when authorities dump waste into the oceans. Also, human-exacerbated climate change will have devastating effects on the world’s poor and development in terms of destructive floods and disastrous droughts. Tackling brown issues must generally take into serious consideration green environmental conservation and the sustainable use of natural resources.

b. Corporate control of the environment means that capitalism ensures extinction.

**Zizek 99**[[7]](#footnote-7)

This already brings us to the second aspect of our critical distance towards risk society theory: the way it approaches the reality of capitalism. Is it not that, on closer examination, its notion of 'risk' indicates a narrow and precisely defined domain in which risks are generated: the domain of the uncontrolled use of science and technology in the conditions of capitalism? The paradigmatic case of 'risk', which is not simply one among many out risk 'as such', is that of a new scientific-technological invention put to use by a private corporation without proper public democratic debate and control, then generating the spectre of unforeseen cata­strophic long-term consequences. However, is not this kind of risk rooted in the fact that **the logic of** market and **profitability is driving privately owned corporations to pursue their course** and use scientific and techno­logical innovations (or simply expand their production) **without actually taking account of the long-term effects of such activity on the environ­ment, as well as the health of humankind itself**? Thus - despite all the talk about a 'second modernity' which compels us to leave the old ideological dilemmas of Left and Right, of capitalism versus socialism, and so on, behind - is not the conclusion to be drawn that in the present global situation, in which **private corporations outside public political control are making decisions which can affect** us all, even up to **our chances of survival,** the only solution lies in a kind of direct socialization of the productive process - in moving towards a society in which global decisions about the fundamental orientation of how to develop and use productive capacities at the disposal of society would somehow be made by the entire collective of the people affected by such decisions? Theorists of the risk society often evoke the need to counteract reign of the 'depoliticized' global market with a move towards radical repoliticization, which will take crucial decisions away from state planners and experts and put them into the hands of the individuals and groups concerned themselves (through the revitalization of active citizenship, broad public debate, and so on) - however, they stop short of putting in question the very basics of the anonymous logic of market relations and global capitalism, which imposes itself today more and more as the 'neutral' Real accepted by all parties and, as such, more and more depoliticized. 34

c. Capitalism imposes a particular way of thinking about the world, making their abstract philosophical conclusions meaningless.

**Marcuse 64** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves, but only in the last analysis; that is, if and when they are free to give their own answer. As long as they are kept incapable of being autonomous, as long as they are indoctrinated and manipulated (down to their very instincts), their answer to this question cannot be taken as their own. By the same token, however, no tribunal can justly arrogate to itself the right to decide which needs should be developed and satisfied. Any such tribunal is reprehensible, although our revulsion does not do away with the question: how can the people who have been the object of effective and productive domination by themselves create the conditions of freedom?4 The more rational, productive, technical, and total the repressive administration of society becomes, the more unimaginable the means and ways by which the administered individuals might break their servitude and seize their own liberation. To be sure, **to impose Reason upon an entire society is** a paradoxical and scandalous idea - although one might dispute the righteousness of a society which ridicules this idea while **making its own population into objects of total administration.** All liberation depends on the consciousness of servitude, and the emergence of this consciousness is always hampered by the predominance of needs and satisfactions which, to a great extent, have become the individual's own. The process always replaces one system of pre-conditioning by another; the optimal goal is the replacement of false needs by true ones, the abandonment of repressive satisfaction. **The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is** its **effective suffocation of** those **needs which demand liberation** - liberation also from that which is tolerable and rewarding and comfortable - while it sustains and absolves the destructive power and repressive function of the affluent society. **Here,** the **social controls exact the** overwhelming **need for** the **production** and consumption **of waste;** the need for **stupefying work where it is no longer a real necessity;** the need for **modes of relaxation which** soothe and **prolong this stupefaction;** the need for maintaining such deceptive liberties as free competition at administered prices, **a free press which censors itself, free choice between brands and gadgets.** Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. The **range of choice** open to the individual **is not the decisive factor in determining** the degree of human **freedom, but what can be chosen** and what is chosen by the individual. The criterion for free choice can never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. **Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves.** Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear - that is, if they sustain alienation. And the **spontaneous reproduction of superimposed needs by the individual does not establish autonomy; it only testifies to the efficacy of the controls.**

The alternative is to endorse revolution against capitalism by slum dwellers in developing countries. Slum dwellers in developing countries are the new proletariat.

**Zizek 8** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

(4) Last, new forms of apartheid, new Walls and slums. On September 11th, 2001, the Twin Towers were hit; twelve years earlier, on November 9th, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. The latter date announced the “happy ‘90s,” the Francis Fukuyama dream of the “end of history,” the belief that liberal democracy had, in principle, won, that the search was over, that the advent of a global, liberal world community was just around the corner, that the obstacles to this ultra-Hollywood happy ending were merely empirical and contingent (local pockets of resistance where the leaders did not yet grasp that their time is over). In contrast, 9/11 is the main symbol of the end of the Clintonite happy ‘90s, of the forthcoming era in which **new walls are emerging everywhere, between Israel and the West Bank, around the E**uropean **U**nion**,** on **the U.S.-Mexico border. So, what if the new proletarian position is** that of the **inhabitants of slums** in the new megalopolises**? The explosive growth of slums** in the last decades, especially **in** the Third World megalopolises from Mexico City and other **Latin America**ncapitals **through Africa** (Lagos, Chad) **to India, China, Philippines and Indonesia, is** perhaps **the crucial geopolitical event of our times**.1 Since, sometime very **soon** (or maybe, given the imprecision of the Third World censuses, it has already happened), **the urban population** of the earth **will outnumber the rural population, and** since **slum inhabitants will compose the majority of the urban population**, we are in no way dealing with a marginal phenomenon. We are thus witnessing the fast growth of the population outside state control, living in conditions half outside the law, in terrible need of the minimal forms of self-organization. Although their population is composed of marginalized laborers, redundant civil servants and expeasants, they are not simply a redundant surplus: they are incorporated into the global economy in numerous ways, many of them working as informal wage workers or self-employed entrepreneurs, with no adequate health or social security coverage. (**The main source of their rise is** the **inclusion of** the **Third World countries in the global economy**, with cheap food imports from the First World countries ruining local agriculture.) **They are the true “symptom” of** slogans like **“Development**,**”** “Modernization,” and “World Market”: not an unfortunate accident, but a necessary product of the innermost logic of global capitalism.2 No wonder the hegemonic form of ideology in slums is Pentecostal Christianity, with its mixture of charismatic miracles-and-spectaclesoriented fundamentalism and social programs like community kitchens and care for children and the elderly. While one should resist the temptation to elevate and idealize slum dwellers into a new revolutionary class, **one should** nonetheless, in Badiou’s terms, **perceive slums as one of the** few **authentic “evental sites” in today’s society— slum-dwellers are** literally a collection of those who are the “part of no part,” the “surnumerary” element of society, excluded from the benefits of citizenship, **uprooted and dispossessed, with “nothing to lose but their chains.” It is surprising how many features of slum dwellers fit the** good old **Marxist determination of the proletarian** revolutionary subject**: they are “free”** in the double meaning of the word **even more than the classic proletariat (**“freed” from all substantial ties; dwelling in a free space, **outside police regulations** of the state**); they are a large collective, forcibly thrown together,** “thrown” into a situation where they have to invent some mode of being-together, **and** simultaneously **deprived of** any **support in traditional ways of life**, in inherited religious or ethnic lifeforms.

## Case

Civil society is fundamentally opposed to animals. The human-animal divide is the foundation of modern biopolitics.

**Wadiwel 8** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

**The civil political sphere** – that space where human public politics occurs, where ‘the political is declared,’ often through government, representation, measured participation and the ballot - **has inherent limitations that frustrate** the project of **ending violence towards animals. Animals are** “by nature” **always**, at best, **secondary entities, not due** the **political agency** that is **naturally bestowed** up**on humans**. In this way aperceived fundamental differentiation undermines any claim for equivalent political agency between human and non human, and assures that animals, even if granted consideration, will always be owed a lesser degree of responsibility. These limitations very clearly underpin animal welfare approaches, which seek to minimise animal suffering without necessarily changing the frameworks of violence and power that perpetuate this suffering. For example, the notion that slaughter houses are tolerable once perceived pain is eliminated. **Animal rights approaches** often fare better in this regard by seeking to demonstrate the existence of unjustifiable speciesism in order to guarantee equal protections. One of their principle arguments is that the life that is held by both non human and human animals alike has an intrinsic value. Yet rights approaches themselves face constraints that **reproduce the same fundamental differentiation** – the gap – between human and non human. For instance, in the “life boat case,” Tom Reagan stops short of agreeing that the death of an animal would constitute the same harm as the death of a human (2004: 324). Recent work by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (see 1998, 1999 and 2004) provides an opportunity to consider the place of animals within politics from a different standpoint than other approaches, such as animal rights or animal welfare interventions. Agamben’s focus on the concept of biopolitics, his attention to the relationship of politics to violence and to legitimation and the relation between the human and the non human, make his work worthy of analysis by those interested in the violence perpetrated by humans against non human animal life, even if Agamben’s own conclusions are themselves not aimed at finding solutions to these problems (see Wadiwel, 2003). While this approach differs from animal rights or welfare strategies in that it focuses concern on the nature and meaning of politics itself and its relationship to animality (Agamben understands **the political sphere** as a space that **aims to exclude animal life as its primary activity**), this approach does not seek to promote action within the terms of the civil political space. Rather it challenges the very boundaries of this space itself. Thus, although Agamben is no champion of animal rights or welfare, his philosophy offers a different way to conceptualise “the problem of the animal.” The term “biopolitics” is taken from Michel Foucault’s description of the contemporary focus of power towards biological life, its vicissitudes, its requirements, and its essence. An example of the effect of biopower within contemporary government is the focus upon meeting the broad biological needs of human populations: today government concerns itself with the deployment of resources for education and training, public health, the facilitation of relationships and organisations, fertility and “family” planning, the management of the economy, and the generalised financial well being of populations. Where Foucault treats biopolitics as a relatively modern form of rationality, tied closely with the emergence of government and the disciplines, Agamben suggests that the connection between biopower and the political space is much more significant and enduring. According to Agamben, **biological life is given** both **place** and meaning **within** the domain of **sovereignty through** its position of **vulnerability in relation to sovereign power.** Following Walter Benjamin, Agamben defines the life constituted by exception as “bare life,” which he identifies as the “bearer of the link between life and law” (1998: 65). **Bare life represents life contained within** the “zone of indistinction” or **the sovereign** ban, a life which is neither constituted by law, nor by divine justice, **where it is licit for sovereign power to “kill without committing homicide** and without celebrating a sacrifice**”** (83). It is **for this reason** that Agamben insists in his definition of ‘bare life,’ that **sovereignty constitutes life within the context of** a **power over life and death**: in Agamben’s words “human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed” (85). Biopolitical rationales become inseparable from the exceptional character of sovereign power, since the constitution of the political sphere itself necessarily entails the constitution of life (181). Thus, in so far as political sovereignty in the Western tradition defines itself through the capture of biological life, it is biopolitical in origin. Further, Agamben suggests that this view of political sovereignty assists to resolve the apparent tension between Foucault’s two apparently divergent foci of study: namely, “political techniques” associated with the State and government and “technologies of the self” relating to the disciplines and individuated power (5). In Agamben’s insistence that biopolitics is synonymous with the whole history of politics in the West, he identifies a process that unites the activity of state sovereignty with the evolution of individuated forms of biological control. Agamben remarks: “It can be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception” (6). Not only does **Agamben** identify closely the relation between biology and the political sphere, but he also **identifies this process as constitutive of the human / animal divide.** In The Open: Man and Animal, Agamben states: “In our culture, **the decisive political conflict, which governs every other conflict, is** that **between** the **animality and** the **humanity** of man**. That is to say,** in its origin **Western politics is** also **biopolitics**.” (Agamben, 2004: 80). I should be clear here that is not controversial in itself that Agamben should consider animal life within his understanding of biopolitics. After all, Foucault himself was aware of the long philosophical connection between human life and that of animals that gave shape to biopower: thus Foucault states “modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (Foucault, 1998: 143). But what is interesting in relation to Agamben’s understanding is that the contestation between human and animal should figure as defining of biopolitics itself, rather than a mere feature. Biopower (or politics in the West) is, before any thing else, a question of determining the distinction between human and animal. What interests me in Agamben’s pronouncements– if we hold them as true - is the possibility not merely of telling a history of biopolitics as the history of politics in the West, but tracing the genealogy of the relationship between the human, the animal and thus the biopolitical. There is an opportunity to revisit the “primal” scenes of Western public politics in order to draw attention to the curious recurrence of the animal within the development of the human political subject, and highlighting the fact that this subject is mapped by threshold points which although operate to formally exclude animal life, also intersect, and are grounded in, the animal. **It is** after all **no coincidence**, as I shall discuss, **that Aristotle describes “[hu]man” as the political animal;** that entity that finds its home within the polis; **an animal that is** at once **an animal, yet** is **also beyond other animals due to its natural residence within political community. This construction of the** human political **subject illustrates the** necessary **biopolitical connection of the human to** its **animal bare existence** – its biological soul if you like – that speaks and yet does not speak at the same time as the fully formed human subject. The animal arrives as a necessary burden to the human political subject, the connection to biological life it cannot seem to shake, and in many respects, the destiny that it inescapably returns to. Below, I provide three fragments on the animal from the classical age. These fragments are not intended to provide definitive statements on the positions of these thinkers on animals. Rather they intend to highlight the curious positioning of the animal with respect to the human, and the implication of this co-deportment for politics in the Western tradition. Thus, the fragments I look at are in many respects taken for what they are; the question I pose throughout is why they are positioned in the way that they are, and in what way do they illustrate something about the intersection of animal and human life, and its relationship to politics. These intertwinings are significant, as they indicate the historical existence of an active process of dividing between the human and the animal, a process that simultaneously defines the frontiers of the civil political space. And the flow on from this intersection, as I shall discuss in the conclusion to this paper, are the inherent limitation of engaging with the civil political space when this same sphere maintains as a principle of its operation a primary exclusion of non human animal life.

# NR T

## AT 1AR Policymaking Bad

Arguing that a current government policy is bad is not roleplaying

**Harris 13** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. **This idea** that **debate is about role playing** being a part of the government **puzzles me** greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now **never once have I role played being** part of **the government**. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott **Harris has formed** many **opinions about what the government** and other institutions **should or should not do without** ever role playing **being part of those institutions**. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. **I have no idea** at all **why it would be oppressive** for someone **to form an opinion about** whether or not they think **the government** should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

Analysis of policy is particularly empowering, even if I’m not a developing country policymaker.

**Shulock 99** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

**As interesting as** our **politics might be with** the kinds of changes outlined by proponents of participatory and **critical** policy **analysis, we do not need these** changes **to justify** our **investment in policy analysis**. Policy analysis already involves discourse, introduces ideas into politics, and affects policy outcomes. The problem is not that policymakers refuse to understand the value of traditional policy analysis or that policy analysts have not learned to be properly interactive with stakeholders and reflective of multiple and nontechnocratic perspectives. The problem, in my view, is only that policy analysts, policymakers, and observers alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. Policy analysis has changed, right along with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse that shapes citizen preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political environment. Regardless of what the textbooks say, there does not need to be a client in order for ideas from policy analysis to resonate through the policy environment.10¶ Certainly there is room to make our politics more inclusive. But those **critics who see policy analysis as a tool** of the power elite **might be less concerned if they understood that analysts are only adding to the debate**—they are unlikely to be handing ready-made policy solutions to elite decisionmakers for implementation. Analysts themselves might be more contented if they started appreciating the appropriation of their ideas by the whole gamut of policy participants and stopped counting the number of times their clients acted upon their proposed solutions. And the cynics disdainful of the purported objectivism of analysis might relax if analysts themselves would acknowledge that **they are seeking not truth, but to elevate** the level of **debate with** a **compelling, evidence-based presentation** of their perspectives. Whereas critics call, unrealistically in my view, for analysts to present competing perspectives on an issue or to “design a discourse among multiple perspectives,” I see no reason why an individual analyst must do this when multiple perspectives are already in abundance, brought by multiple analysts. If we would acknowledge that policy analysis does not occur under a private, contractual process whereby hired hands advise only their clients, we would not worry that clients get only one perspective.¶ **Policy analysis is used**, far more **extensively** than is commonly believed. Its use could be appreciated and expanded if policymakers, citizens, and analysts themselves began to present it more accurately, not as a comprehensive, problem-solving, scientific enterprise, but **as a contributor to informed discourse**. For years Lindblom [1965, 1968, 1979, 1986, 1990] has argued that we should understand policy analysis for the limited tool that it is—just one of several routes to social problem solving, and an inferior route at that. Although I have learned much from Lindblom on this odyssey from traditional to interpretive policy analysis, my point is different. Lindblom sees analysis as having a very limited impact on policy change due to its ill-conceived reliance on science and its deluded attempts to impose comprehensive rationality on an incremental policy process. I, with the benefit of recent insights of Baumgartner, Jones, and others into the dynamics of policy change, see that even **with** these **limitations**, policy **analysis can have a major impact on policy. Ideas**, aided by institutions and embraced by citizens, **can reshape the policy landscape**. Policy analysis can supply the ideas.

Decision making skills are a voter. It has an out of round impact as the most portable and flexible skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy.

**Steinberg and Freeley 13** writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

**In** the spring of **2011**, facing a legacy of problematic U.S, military involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and criticism for what some saw as slow sup­port of the United States for the people of Egypt and Tunisia as citizens of those nations ousted their formerly American-backed dictators, the administration of President Barack **Obama considered** its **options in** providing support for rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in **Libya**. Public debate was robust as the administration sought to determine its most appropriate action. The president ultimately decided to engage in an international coalition, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 through a number of measures including establishment of a no-fly zone through air and missile strikes to support rebels in Libya, but stopping short of direct U.S. intervention with ground forces or any occupation of Libya. While the action seemed to achieve its immediate objectives, most notably the defeat of Qaddafi and his regime, the American president received both criticism and praise for his mea­sured yet assertive decision. In fact, **the past decade has challenged American leaders to make** many difficult **decisions in response to** potentially **catastrophic problems**. Public debate has raged in chaotic environment of political division and apparent animosity, The process of public decision making may have never been so consequential or difficult. Beginning in the fall of 2008, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a growing eco­nomic crisis and responded in part with '’bailouts'' of certain Wall Street financial entities, additional bailouts of Detroit automakers, and a major economic stimu­lus package. All these actions generated substantial public discourse regarding the necessity, wisdom, and consequences of acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011, the president and the Congress participated in heated debates (and attempted negotiations) to raise the nation's debt ceiling such that the U.S. Federal Govern­ment could pay its debts and continue government operations. This discussion was linked to a debate about the size of the exponentially growing national debt, gov­ernment spending, and taxation. Further, in the spring of 2012, U.S. leaders sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon capability while gas prices in the United States rose, The United States considered its ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan in the face of nationwide protests and violence in that country1 sparked by the alleged burning of Korans by American soldiers, and Americans observed the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad and Syrian forces as they killed Syrian citizens in response to a rebel uprising in that nation and considered the role of the United States in that action. Meanwhile, public discourse, in part generated and intensified by the cam­paigns of the GOP candidates for president and consequent media coverage, addressed issues dividing Americans, including health care, women's rights to reproductive health services, the freedom of churches and church-run organiza­tions to remain true to their beliefs in providing (or electing not to provide) health care services which they oppose, the growing gap between the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans and the rest of the American population, and continued high levels of unemployment. More division among the American public would be hard to imagine. Yet through all the tension, conflict was almost entirely ver­bal in nature, aimed at discovering or advocating solutions to growing problems. **Individuals also face**d daunting **decisions. A** young **couple**, underwater with their mortgage and struggling to make their monthly payments, **considered walking away from their loan**; elsewhere **a** college **sophomore** **reconsidered his major** **and a senior her choice of** law school, graduate **school**, or a job and a teenager decided between an iPhone and an iPad. **Each of these** situations **called for decisions** to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. **We make countless** individual **decisions every day**. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consider­ation: others scorn to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and co­workers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make deci­sions that impact us all. **Every profession requires effective** and ethical **decision making**, **as do our school, community, and social organizations**. We all engage in discourse surrounding our necessary decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an eco­nomical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candi­date to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Should we watch The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue—all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet **even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making**. In 2006, Time magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of his­tory, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis," and social networking sites, knowledge and truth are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. Through a quick keyword search, we have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? Much of what suffices as information is not reliable, or even ethically motivated. **The ability** of every decision maker **to make good**, reasoned, and ethical **deci­sions' relies** heavily up**on their ability** **to think critically**. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength, And, critical thinking offers tools enabling the user to better understand the' nature and relative quality of the message under consider­ation. Critical thinkers are better users of information as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California's requirement states; Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambigu­ous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive arid deductive processes, including an under­standing of die formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. **Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs**, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly com­petitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing, and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical con­sequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring our solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism,"1 **Debate** as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving **uniquely** **promotes** development of each of **these skill sets.** Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary **research confirms** the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves die thinking of those involved,2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a com­prehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, "'The debate-critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof ■favoring a positive debate-critical thinking relationship.11'1 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates, formal or informal, These take place in intrapersonal commu­nications, with which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, and in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to argu­ments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our **success or failure in life is** largely **determined by our ability to make** wise decisions for ourselves **and** to **influence the decisions of’ others** in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few Of the thousands of deci­sions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of respon­sibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate. Some people make decision by flipping a coin. Others act on a whim or respond unconsciously to “hidden persuaders.” If the problem is trivial—such as whether to go to a concert or a film—the particular method used is unimportant. For more crucial matters, however, **mature adults** **require** a **reasoned methods of decision making**. Decisions should be justified by good reasons based on accurate evidence and valid reasoning.

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13. David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, Argumentation and Debate

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